were infringing copyright by exchanging music files in the MP3 format via a peer-to-peer 2 ("P2P") network known as Napster. The breathtaking sweep of this holding-that almost onequarter of the population of the United States was engaging in illegal (and likely criminal ) 3 activity-was reason enough to give the case a second look. But most of the scholarly attention lavished on the Napster case focused on Napster's secondary liability for providing the technology of infringement. There has been little analysis of the primary infringement committed by Napster's users.
Indeed, the alleged primary infringement of P2P users seems to be an example of a phenomenon one sometimes encounters in the common law: A case finds liability, with little or no analysis. A later case also finds liability, with no independent analysis, citing the first case. A 106(1); and distribution, § 106(3). Napster users who upload file names to the search index for others to copy violate plaintiffs' distribution rights. Napster users who download files containing copyrighted music violate plaintiffs' reproduction rights." Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. This may be because the district court's finding that the plaintiffs had made a prima facie case of infringement, sufficient to sustain a preliminary injunction, was not appealed by Napster, which focused its energies on attempting to establish various defenses. Id. at 1013.
See infra note 105.
5
For example, Judge Posner in the Aimster case said only: 6 Teenagers and young adults who have access to the Internet like to swap computer files containing popular music. If the music is copyrighted, such swapping, which involves making and transmitting a digital copy of the music, infringes copyright. The swappers, who are ignorant or more commonly disdainful of copyright and in any event discount the likelihood of being sued or prosecuted for copyright infringement, are the direct infringers.
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643, 645 (7th Cir. 2003) . The Ninth Circuit's second P2P case, currently on certiorari to the Supreme Court, has even less to say: "The question of direct copyright infringement is not at issue in this case. Rather, the [plaintiffs] contend that the [defendants] are liable for the copyright infringement of their users." Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 , 1160 , cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___ , 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) . Two cases filed against individual users of P2P networks have resulted in reported decisions by trial courts, but neither addresses the copyright infringement question on the merits; both cases disposed of motions to quash subpoenas for the discovery of the identity of P2P users. See Elektra Entertainment Group, Inc. v. Does 1-9, 2004 WL 2095581 (S.D.N.Y.) ; Sony Music Entertainment Inc. v. Does 1-40, 2004 WL 1656538 (S.D.N.Y.) . Elektra involved litigation against P2P users claimed to be distributing music:
The plaintiffs allege that they have found each of the defendants openly disseminating sound recordings whose copyrights they own on the P2P network. Plaintiffs themselves logged on to the P2P network and viewed the files that each defendant was offering to other users. According to plaintiffs, each defendant has chosen to make available from his or her computer hundreds of sound recordings whose copyrights are owned by various of the plaintiffs.
Elektra at *1. Nevertheless, the court went on to highlight the Doe defendant's copying (downloading) of music files: [P] laintiffs have determined that many sound recordings were ripped by different people using different brands of ripping software. Such information creates a strong inference that Doe No. 7 was not simply copying his or her own lawfully purchased CDs onto a computer, but had downloaded those files from other P2P users.
In this article, I will analyze the activities of P2P users to determine more precisely which, if any, of their actions infringe copyright. I suggest that one reason courts do not delve more deeply into the question of direct infringement is that in fully-litigated cases, the alleged direct infringers are not before the courts; their rights are being adjudicated in absentia. Moreover, the actual defendants in these cases-the alleged secondary infringers-are poor proxies for the users of P2P networks and have no incentive to promote clear judicial analysis, because clear analysis will result in secondary liability. Yet it is important from a policy standpoint to be clear 7 about which activities infringe and which do not.
Part II of this Article will describe the process of copyright lawmaking and the recent evolution of copyright law in response to technology. This discussion will include a brief description of conventional and P2P network technology. A copyright analysis of user activities on P2P networks follows in Part III, which argues that the nature of copyright legislation requires courts to be especially careful and precise in determining the contours of infringing noncommercial conduct by members of the public. The analysis in Part III will lead to the conclusion that copying by P2P users does not infringe copyright, but distribution does. In Part IV, I address some strategic considerations affecting copyright enforcement and P2P networks, and I will argue that the rights of consumers to use copyrighted works are gravely threatened by the current of litigation against secondary infringers. Finally, I propose the reinvigoration of Sony as a way 8 to preserve the public benefit of P2P technology.
Here I mean to include both the musical work, e.g., the song, and the sound recording in which the song 9 is embodied. More about this distinction later (see infra notes 44-59 and accompanying text), although for my purpose, it is not really important except insofar as there are typically multiple plaintiffs entitled to claim infringement by user activities on P2P networks. Other works, of course, have been the subject of recent copyright litigation, and some of those lawsuits, like Napster, have generated some press. E.g., Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001 The media have devoted a great of attention to online exchange of music files. Napster, for example, 10 was a cover story for both NEWSWEEK (June 5, 2000) and TIME (October 2, 2000) magazines. More recently, the motion picture industry has also participated in lawsuits against the providers of P2P technology. See Metro-Goldwyn-Myer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.) , cert. granted, ___ U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) .
This may be because its legitimate distribution typically is in a digital (compact disc) format, and it is 11 therefore easily converted into a digital compressed (MP3) format suitable for P2P distribution. See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011. Or perhaps it is because works of popular music are short, producing relatively small files that don't take very long to transmit. Or maybe it is because the audience for popular music is young and relatively technologically savvy, and thus willing to learn what is necessary to trade files embodying its preferred musical entertainment. Probably all of these are factors.
See 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (2000) . 12 Sometimes (a little repulsively) referred to as "meatspace." analysis exists regarding direct infringement on P2P networks is found in the Napster case (which involved only music). Consequently, most of this discussion will focus on the direct infringement of music. While some of this will apply to all subject matter, there are some ways in which music is treated differently than other copyrighted works (for example, movies).
The dominant use of P2P networks is to facilitate the personal copying of recorded music, an activity that in other contexts is indisputably legal. For example, copyright law permits Joe to borrow a CD of recorded music from his friend, Sally, take it home, and copy it to a digital or analog medium for his own personal use. A credible argument can be made that the functional 12 equivalent of this activity-copying the file directly from Sally's computer via a P2P network on the internet-should be treated the same way. The analogy is not perfect, however; there are some differences between what happens face-to-face and what happens over P2P networks. In the physical world, Joe and Sally must know each other in order to establish a relationship in 13 which Sally will loan Joe her CD. Moreover, Sally must trust Joe enough to loan him the CD, See infra notes 31, 140-43, 146 and accompanying text. 14 E.g., Napster, 239 F.3d at 1014. 15 6 since there is at least some risk she'll never see it again. Similarly, Joe's ability to copy CDs is limited by the CDs his friends (including Sally) have in their possession, which may or may not include the particular music Joe wants to copy.
On a P2P network, by contrast, Joe and Sally do not need to know each other. And Sally need not trust Joe, because she isn't "giving" Joe something in the sense that she will be deprived of it. Finally, on a P2P network, Joe can search the collections of thousands, perhaps millions, of users, who collectively make available much, if not most, of the recorded music currently available for purchase. Joe's internet "friends" are far more likely to have the music Joe wants than the physical circle of even an extremely outgoing person's friends. These differences make P2P activities more threatening to content owners, who see such networks as decentralized, anonymous, and therefore highly dangerous, piracy. But the difference between Joe's physical and cyberspace activities lies not so much in what Joe does, which, after all, is simply copying music for personal use. The important difference is that the Joe's myriad internet friends make their collections of music available not only to Joe, but to anyone on the P2P network-in short, to the public. Napster, the first P2P network to achieve widespread adoption by users, unsurprisingly became the first target of content owners' ire in a lawsuit filed in California in 1999. And content owners found a receptive judiciary: In Napster, the Ninth Circuit extended the protections accorded to copyright owners by sharply limiting, in the P2P context, the right of music consumers to make personal use copies of recorded music. This right, acknowledged by content owners in 1992, reflects an understanding that noncommercial copying of recorded music for 14 personal use is not within the scope of the copyright holder's monopoly. Surprisingly, the Napster court did not address in any coherent way the nature of the infringement that was taking place on the Napster P2P network, instead referring generally to the "infringement" committed by Napster's users.
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II. TECHNOLOGY AND COPYRIGHT LAWS Advances in technology have historically been marked by copyright controversy, and it is a cliche that the predecessors of modern copyright statutes were developed to address the first technology of mass copying, namely the printing press. Nearly every technological advance touching copyright has required revision of the copyright laws. Significantly, the process of revision itself has for the last century been deemed too complex to entrust to normal American legislative processes, and thus making copyright laws doesn't much resemble making other federal laws, or even other federal intellectual property laws. For about 100 years, copyright legislation has been the product of negotiations among the dominant players in the affected industries; almost no bill has passed that did not reflect the consensus of these industries.
16
Industries based on technology arising after the adoption of a copyright statute are, of course, not represented at the negotiations, and usually find themselves excluded from the elaborate scheme of statutory rights, licenses and exemptions embedded in the copyright law.
17
Thus, within a few years after the Copyright Act of 1909 was passed, the infant motion picture 18 and radio broadcasting industries perplexed Congress and copyright lawyers. Was a motion 19 picture a "dramatic composition" and, if not, might it still be a "drama"? Did projecting a motion picture involve "copying" it? Did broadcasting music to radios in private homes involve a "public performance"? By the time the next revision of the Copyright Act was adopted, issues 20 involving photocopying, sound recordings, and cable television were added to the list. copyright infringement committed by users of videocassette recorders who used them to record the plaintiffs' copyrighted material broadcast by television stations.
Because Sony did not itself copy any of the plaintiffs' works, its liability was derivative of the infringement of its customers. That is, if Sony were liable, it would be for "contributory infringement," rather than direct infringement. The Supreme Court held that "the sale of 27 copying equipment . . . does not constitute contributory infringement if the product is widely used for legitimate, unobjectionable purposes. Indeed, it need merely be capable of substantial, non-infringing uses." The district court had determined that the copyright proprietors in many 28 televised programs did not object to videotaping. Further, the Court held that even unauthorized 29 videotaping would in many cases be fair use, and therefore noninfringing. Consequently, Sony's Id. at 451-53. 30 In the early days of CD technology, commercially available CD's frequently were labeled with a 31 combination of the symbols A and D, signifying which steps of the recording, mastering and reproduction process were carried out in the analog domain and which in the digital domain. Thus "AAD" signified analog recording, analog mastering, and digital reproduction; "DDD," about which consumers were most enthusiastic, meant digital recording, mastering and reproduction. Some CDs continue to be labeled this way, primarily those featuring older content. convinced by Sony that such a lawsuit had only limited prospects for success, the content owners and the hardware manufacturers resolved this controversy the old-fashioned way: They met, negotiated, and proposed their compromise to Congress as the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (the "AHRA"). Congress did its part and enacted the compromise into law.
34
The legislation agreed to by content owners and hardware manufacturers was complex by the standards of the early 1990's, if considerably less so by today's standards. (Compared to the Digital Millenium Copyright Act of 1998, for example, the AHRA is a model of clarity and accessibility.) The essential bargain was this: Content owners agreed not to block the manufacture, importation and distribution of digital recording devices for consumers, and not to bring 17 U.S.C. § 1008 states "No action may be brought under this title alleging infringement of copyright 35 . . . based on the noncommercial use by a consumer [of a digital or analog audio recording device or medium to make] digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings." One assumes that this provision was requested by the hardware manufacturers not out of an altruistic concern for consumers, but rather because their own liability would be derivative of consumer liability, under the doctrine of contributory infringement under Sony. See Sony, 464 U.S. at 434-42. The language states that no action may be brought that is based on certain consumer uses of technology; this would prohibit an action for contributory infringement (or, for that matter, vicarious liability) based on protected consumer activity. Id. § § 1001(11) (definition of "serial copying"); 1002(a) (requirement of serial copy control).
37
In other words, if every possessor of a copy can make more perfect copies, and everyone who gets one 38 of those perfect copies can make still more perfect copies, the number of copies may increase faster than if everyone who wants to make a copy must first gain access to an original. 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a) (2000).
39
Id. § 1001(3), (4)(B)(ii), (5)(B)(ii). 
35
After Sony's holding that home videotaping was (at least in some circumstances) fair use, it must have seemed to content owners that the "right" to sue for home taping was at best in doubt, and therefore something easily conceded.
For their part, the hardware manufacturers agreed to pay a royalty on digital recording devices and media, which was to be divided up among content owners according to a complicated, and ultimately irrelevant-because so few such devices were ever sold-formula. In 36 addition, the hardware side agreed not to market digital audio recording equipment to consumers unless it incorporated a copy control system designed to prevent consumers from making a digital copy of a digital copy (so-called "serial copying"). Content owners saw serial copying as 37 the biggest threat posed by digital recording technology, because serial copies in theory are indistinguishable from the digital original, and copies of copies proliferate more quickly than copies made directly from the original. The technology approved by the parties to regulate serial 38 copying was called the Serial Copy Management System ("SCMS"), and all devices defined as "digital audio recording devices" or "digital audio interface devices" are required to include it.
39
In the negotiations, however, manufacturers of computer hardware and peripheral devices succeeded in exempting their products both from the requirement that they include SCMS copy protection, and from the media royalty. At the time, this seemed acceptable to the record 40 companies, because computers were not a practical means of copying and distributing musical content. A typical CD contains about 700 MB of information; in 1992, the typical hard disk See The Industrial Era: 1991 -1993 access to the internet, and given the transmission speeds of dial-up modems in 1992, it would have taken about 28 days to transmit a CD's worth of information.
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All of this was to change astonishingly quickly: In 1993, the internet became the National Information Infrastructure, and content owners realized that technologies for copying and distributing content were changing faster than the owners could keep up.
B. The Internet, Part I: The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act And so arrived the next, and still current, technology challenge for copyright-the internet. Internet technology, however, is vastly more complex and flexible, and capable of a great deal more, than videocassettes or DAT recording. It isn't surprising, then, that the problems posed by the internet are themselves more numerous, and reach farther into copyright law and policy, than those raised by earlier technology. Indeed, many copyright lawyers have been concerned with little else these past few years; there isn't just one "problem" raised by the internet, but a seemingly endless series of difficult issues.
Once again, the first storm clouds gathered over the recorded music industry. Understanding the record companies' concerns requires a brief digression into the means of exploiting music generally, and what this might mean on the internet.
There are additional means of exploiting musical works, but here I am addressing only recorded music, 44 and specifically recorded music standing along (i.e., not synchronized with a film soundtrack or other audiovisual work). 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) (definitions of "perform" and "perform or display publicly"). 45 See id. (definition of "publication"). 
Music Rights and Copyrights
There are two principal means by which recorded music, standing alone, is exploited:
44
(1) By performance, and (2) by distribution of recordings. The Copyright Act, as a set of negotiated provisions among the many industries that produce and use copyrighted works, has a typically complex model for allocating rights in these cases. First, some terminology should be clarified. What is a "performance"? For our purposes, it will do to state simply that a public performance of recorded music takes place anytime a recorded work is played-made perceptible in auditory form-for the public. This happens when the work is played in a public place, and when the work is transmitted or otherwise communicated to the public. "Distribution," by 45 contrast, is not defined in the Copyright Act, but distribution to the public is commonly understood to be essentially synonymous with "publication," which means distribution of tangible copies (or phonorecords) by sale, rental, lease or lending.
46
A recording of music, however, comprises two distinct copyrights: the musical work, which can be fixed in numerous media (e.g., in sheet music, or in a CD) and the sound recording, which consists of specific sounds fixed in a medium that enables the sounds to be re-created when played back (e.g. tape, CD). The rights in the sound recording and in the musical work are 47 typically owned by different persons: The musical work is usually owned by its publisher, while 48 copyright in the sound recording is usually claimed by the record company entitled to distribute the recording. Equally important, the nature of the rights in the two works is different. Of 49 interest to us is that, before 1995, only the musical work embodied in a sound recording, and not the sound recording itself, had a public performance right. This meant that when, for example, a radio station broadcasted a recording to the public, no performance payment was due the record See 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), which does not include "sound recordings" among the works that enjoy a 50 public performance right. . Thus, until 1995, they have had to content themselves with the "free" promotion their products receive when they are played on the radio (although recurrent "payola" scandals, in which record companies are alleged to have bribed radio stations for airplay, continue to surface and raise doubts about whether this promotion is "free" in the way that lunch is sometimes said to be). The first time a composition is recorded and phonorecords are distributed to the public, the license is 58 not compulsory; the publisher may grant or deny the right. For subsequent recordings, however, the Copyright Act specifies that the owner of the musical work may not withhold the license; it is available to anyone on payment of the fee specified under the Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2000); see 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § § 8.04 [B] , [C] .
A"download" is a transmission of a file that becomes fixed and identifiable on the recipient's computer, 59 which can be played and replayed when the recipient chooses without the need for further transmission of information. This scenario differs from the performance scenario that was of concern to record companies, in which each time the recipient wants to hear the file it must be requested and transmitted. 14 Record companies were concerned that in the not-too-distant future, their businesses, built on the distribution of tangible copies, would no longer be viable. In a world in which a comprehensive recorded library of music existed, which could be accessed by anyone at any time and from any place, no one would need to own tangible copies of recorded music any longer. If Sally wanted to hear a particular selection, she would simply request that it be transmitted, and then listen to the transmission. Consumers want the content, not the medium. Record companies, however, 55 historically have been in the business of distributing the media in which content is embodied-of distributing the containers in which content is packaged. The celestial jukebox, by making 56 tangible copies of recorded music obsolete, also made obsolete the business model on which record companies depend. Record companies saw no means under the pre-1995 Act of extracting revenue from this scenario.
The celestial jukebox was not necessarily threatening to music publishers, as each audible transmission to a requesting member of the public would be compensable to them as a public performance. Music publishers, however, had their own concerns about the internet. A common activity of publishers involves the licensing of musical works for "mechanical reproduction," meaning the embodiment of the works in sound recordings. Each time a composition is recorded and phonorecords -tangible objects embodying the sounds fixed in the recording-are 57 distributed to the public, a mechanical license must be obtained and a fee paid. These fees 58 account for a substantial portion of music publishers' income, and publishers saw the fees threatened by the internet. Mechanical licensing was necessary before a tangible phonorecord embodying a musical work could be made and distributed to the public. But what if the public chose instead to download digital files encoding the same music? Publishers were concerned Pub. L. No. 104-39, 109 Stat. 336 (1995) . that a musical work recorded, but disseminated via the internet rather than by distribution of tangible objects, would be exempt from mechanical licensing.
The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
Clearly it was again time for a compromise. And so the record companies and music publishers (along with broadcasters, cable companies, and other affected industries), returned to the bargaining table, each with its concerns, and worked out a solution, enacted by Congress as the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (the "DPRSRA"). Record 60 companies received an exclusive right to perform publicly their sound recordings by means of digital transmissions. This meant that users of the hypothetical "celestial jukebox" who 61 62 wanted to dispense with ownership of physical recordings of music would now have to pay record companies for the right to listen to the recordings, in addition to music publishers (who were, even before 1995, entitled to payment). This seems a fair outcome, because in a not-yet realized world in which content can be transmitted so easily, "performance" may be the only compensable event for the owner of copyright in a sound recording.
63
For their part, music publishers got acknowledgment from the record companies that transmitting a music file, when it is reproduced and specifically identifiable on the receiving computer, is the practical equivalent of distributing phonorecords and therefore that a mechanical license must be obtained for such distribution (called "digital phonorecord delivery" by the 17 U.S.C. § 115(c), (d) (2000). Once the parties' compromise was in place, however, publishers 64 decided that perhaps they had been too hasty in settling for merely a mechanical license fee for digital phonorecord distribution. They currently take the position that digital phonorecord distribution inevitably also implicates their performance right, even when the transmission resulting in an identifiable recording (e.g., and MP3 file) is inaudible while in progress. For example, a transmission that is audible as it progresses, and when it is complete, leaves behind a 67 file that the recipient can replay at will, would constitute both a performance and a distribution. See 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 8.23 [B] [2] at 8-357 n.41 and accompanying text; cf. id. § 8.23 [B] [5] at 8-360 (observing that if an "activity is exempt from liability under the transmission scheme, it is similarly exempt from liability under the amended mechanical license") (footnotes omitted).
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Copyright Act). In addition, the owner of copyright in the sound recording was entitled to a fee 64 for exercise of its exclusive right to distribute the sound recording to the public. 65 And so, for a little while, it seemed that the problem of music transmission on the internet had been solved. If transmission takes place in a "digital performance" mode, in which it is audible as it is being transmitted, both the publisher and the record company have a perfor-66 mance right and are entitled to a fee. The change in this case was to protect the record company against a future in which performance, rather than distribution, was the principal way to make money from sound recordings-publishers already had a performance right. If, on the other hand, the transmission is inaudible while it is in progress, but results in an identifiable reproduction on the recipient's system, thereby substituting for the distribution of a tangible copy, publishers are entitled to their mechanical license fee, and the record company is entitled to a fee for distribution of phonorecords. Finally, if the transmission is both a public performance and results in an identifiable reproduction on the recipient's computer, then performance rights and distribution 67 rights need to be licensed, in each case from both the record company and the publisher. Note where a digital audio transmission is a digital phonorecord delivery as well as a public performance of a sound recording, the fact that the public performance may be exempt from liability . . . does not in any way limit or impair the sound recording copyright owner's rights and remedies under section 106(3) against the transmitter for the distribution of a phonorecord of the sound recording. As another example, where [a] digital audio transmission constitutes a distribution of a phonorecord as well as a public performance of a sound recording, the fact that the transmitting entity has obtained a license to perform the sound recording does not in any way limit or affect the entity's obligation to obtain a license to distribute phonorecords . . . .") (emphasis added).
Accord, 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 8.23 [B] [4] at 8-359 to 8-360. 69 The author used the services of bandwidthplace.com (http://bandwidthplace.com/speedtest/) to test the 70 speed of his cable connection. On March 10, 2005, it measured 4.6 million bits per second, and downloaded a 1 MB file in 1.8 seconds. At this speed, a 700 MB file would take only about 21 minutes to transmit.
At 20 gigabytes, the typical hard disk today can store about 500,000 times the information of its 71 counterpart in 1992. Even as capacity increased dramatically, costs dropped. Today's 20-gigabyte hard disk sells for about $150, compared with $300 for a 40-megabyte hard disk in 1992. 17 that both record companies' and publishers' rights are directed to actions taken by the party transmitting, rather than the party receiving, the music: Since 1992 the AHRA has permitted 68 consumers to make digital musical recordings and analog musical recordings, as long as they were noncommercial (i.e., for personal use). This did not leave record companies and publishers unprotected, however, as they had unlimited rights to pursue those engaging in commercial reproduction, as well as non-reproduction activity (e.g. distribution, performance) of any stripe.
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Unfortunately for both industries, however, technology swiftly washed away these hastily-erected breakwaters.
C. The Internet, Part II: The No Electronic Theft and Digital Millennium Copyright Acts First, transmission speed increased almost unimaginably. Merely ten years after the Home Recording Act was passed, cable modems can achieve transmission speeds nearly 1,300 times faster than dial-up modems in the early 1990's, drastically cutting transmission times. What . This provision is intended to prohibit trafficking in devices that defeat copy controls, whereas its counterpart in § 1201(a)(1)-(2) prohibits both using and trafficking in devices that defeat access controls. The wording of the clauses is revealing: "Access" is not a right enjoyed by copyright holders, while copying is. Thus the prohibition relating to copy controls talks in terms of "a right of a copyright owner"; the prohibition relating to access controls protects technological measures that enforce a right copyright owners don't formally have. Moreover, the latter prohibits not merely trafficking in such technology, but even using it.
For these reasons, and others, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act has been extensively criticized in 77 some quarters, even as it has been defended in others. See, e.g., LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 16; Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control Over New Technologies of Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 REV. , 1631 REV. -36 (2001 .
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The result of these technological advances was to give consumers the ability conveniently to copy, compress, and transmit music files, using technology that (because it is computer equipment) is exempt from the AHRA and therefore does not need to incorporate copy controls. While the negotiations between the record companies and the music publishers that produced the DPRSRA may have been adequate to adjust relations between those parties, they did nothing to prepare either party for the vastly increased ability of consumers to themselves copy and transmit sound recordings.
Content owners responded to this threat in two ways. First, in the No Electronic Theft Act, they succeeded in substantially strengthening the penalties for copyright infringement, Despite their many efforts to protect themselves from technology, content owners almost immediately found themselves threatened again. The patchwork of fixes applied to the Copyright Act between 1992 and 1998 was founded on an idea that itself turned out to be dangerously flawed, namely that content owners could maintain control of the distribution of their works. The AHRA immunized copying, but not distribution, by consumers; the unstated assumption was that consumers lacked the ability widely to distribute the works they were allowed to copy. The DPRSRA addressed electronic distribution, but only to specify that such distribution was compensable to copyright owners. The DMCA, too, is useful only to the extent that distributed copies, already in public hands, are controlled by technological methods. In fact, because the issue is the power to prevent distribution, and not merely the right to do so, legislation alone may not be up to the task.
The flaw in content owners' thinking was not immediately apparent. As long as distribution of music files took place in the context of the traditional architecture of the worldwide web, where a central server stored files and made them available to users downloading them, it was possible to control illicit distribution by vigorous enforcement directed at the web sites distributing content. The DPRSRA and the No Electronic Theft Act provided useful tools for this. The 81 advent of P2P technology in the late 1990's, however, decentralized the process of distribution and quickly exposed the fragility of the assumption that distribution could be managed. One can readily imagine content owners' panic, then, when P2P technology left them with no point at which the tide of distribution could be stemmed.
P2P technology was envisioned years ago as a means to avoid the bottlenecks that can occur when many users simultaneously attempt to access a server, overwhelming its capacity to Again, this is a simplified description. Most busy web sites distribute their processing load among 83 numerous servers, but the point is that for any given number of servers, there exists a number of users that will overwhelm the servers' processing capacity.
Habits die hard. Even after networks became common, network administrators referred to the tendency 84 of users physically to transport floppy disks from their desktop computers to other computers as the "sneakernet."
See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1011. process the users' requests. It was not invented to facilitate copyright infringement; rather, it is 82 a technological solution to a problem of computer network architecture. Until recently, however, it was neither practical nor popular. The following is a simplified description, first of the problem that P2P helps to solve, and then of P2P technology as currently implemented for consumers.
In the traditional ("one-to-many") model, users access a web site, physically located on a server-a computer whose task is to respond to user requests (for example, to view a file, to receive and process user orders, or any of the myriad functions performed by web sites). In this model, one server responds to many users, and the model was a vast improvement over that 83 prevalent in the pre-network era, when information generally had to be delivered physically to the computer on which it was used. For all its relative efficiency, however, the one-to-many 84 model has some shortcomings easily noticed by users and web site proprietors. From the user's perspective, a bottleneck is created when server capacity is overtaxed by the number of user requests. That is, logging on to a busy server results in very slow responses, or even in some cases a complete failure to respond. From the web site proprietor's perspective, it is expensive to store vast amounts of information on servers. Moreover, a successful business model implies that the more information is stored, the more users will be attracted to the information, necessitating additional processing capacity-and thus additional investment-to avoid bottlenecks that will make response times unacceptably slow and thereby drive users away.
P2P technology addresses these concerns by reconfiguring the model of information storage and retrieval. In the P2P model, each user's computer acts simultaneously as a server and as a client. The result is a "many-to-many" configuration; many servers to many users. Because each connected computer functions simultaneously as a client and as a server, each computer is a "peer" of the other connected computers; hence the term "peer-to-peer." Napster, the first However, as server-based web sites proliferate, it becomes increasingly difficult to search them and 87 maintain an accurate, reasonably current index of their contents. The result of this is familiar to most web users-links displayed by search engines that lead nowhere.
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012.
88
Id. at 1011-12.
89
Id. at 1012. 90 21 gave each user the option to "open" one or more directories of her hard disk to other users, making the files contained in those directories available for transmission to other users upon their request.
P2P network architecture has two main advantages over conventional architecture. First, there are fewer bottlenecks caused by user activity, because each user interacts one-on-one with the particular other user that has the desired information. Second, unlike conventional network architecture, there is no need to store all the information that users may seek in a central location. Instead, each user on the network provides a little storage space by storing the information in which that user is interested. The information that the most users are interested in is stored in the most locations, further improving the efficiency of access and retrieval.
However, P2P networks raise problems of their own, particularly in connection with searching for information. In conventional web architecture, searches are made of web servers, rather than of every user's computer. The number of servers is small compared to the number of client computers, and so searches can proceed relatively quickly. Also, because web servers are comparatively stable, and tend to stay connected to the internet, they can be effectively searched by software that indexes their contents periodically and makes the index available. On a P2P 87 network, users log on and off constantly, and because the users are where the information resides, a search requires navigating from one user to another to locate the desired information.
To solve the problem of slow searches, Napster enhanced P2P network architecture by centralizing the search function. Napster's enhanced P2P architecture established a central index of all information-in this case, all the MP3-encoded music files-located on the user/servers, in real time (i.e., updated as users log on and off). Thus, when a user logged on to the Napster site, 88 she was able to access the centrally-maintained index, which was immediately updated to include the files, if any, that she chose to share with other Napster users. Because the index was central, 89 searches were very fast compared with non-enhanced P2P alternatives. MP3 files themselves were never located on the Napster server, which maintained only an index of the files shared by Napster's users. The index permitted users to search for file names, and displayed the search 90 results in the form of links on which a user could click to begin the process of downloading the file directly from another user. Thus, at any moment, a Napster user (the "downloading user") See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154, 1159-60 (9th Cir.), cert. If ordinary people are to see copyrights as equivalent to tangible property, and accord copyright rules the respect they give to other property rules, then we would need, at a minimum, to teach them the rules that govern intellectual property when we teach them the rules that govern other personal property, which is to say in elementary school. The problem, though, is that our current copyright statute could not be taught in elementary school, because elementary school students could not understand it. Indeed, their teachers couldn't understand it. Copyright lawyers don't understand it." 22 might be downloading a file from another user (the "distributing user"), who was sharing that file by permitting the download.
After the litigation against Napster resulted in its shutdown, other P2P indexing strategies were implemented in an attempt to avoid Napster's fate. The two principal indexing technologies in use today are the decentralized model and the "supernode" model. The decentralized model involves no central index at all, and provides no solution to the problem of slow searches 91 described above. In the supernode model, certain computers on the network are automatically designated as supernodes by the P2P software, based largely on their having technical characteristics that make them suitable to serve as indexing servers. Rather than searching the index of every user connected to the network, a user searches only the supernodes.
92
With this understanding of the activities that take place on P2P networks, we are ready 93 to examine their copyright implications.
III. P2P USERS AND COPYRIGHT LAW

A. The Argument for Precision
It is important to be precise about the activities of P2P network users and the specific rights of copyright owners affected by those activities. As the history of Copyright Act revision demonstrates, content owners carefully negotiate the precise scope of their respective rights and the exceptions to those rights. When disputes arise among the parties who negotiated the terms of the Copyright Act, the parties are fastidious about the rights and exceptions. Now that content owners are applying the Act to consumers, who were not represented in the negotiations over its details, it is at least as important-if not more so-to be specific about these details. REV. 754 (2001) . Even if "progress" might also connote qualitative improvement, dissemination is a key factor: In the absence of the latter, the former becomes unlikely.
The importance of promoting access to works was emphasized by the Supreme Court in Sony, which 99 held that a person providing technology "capable of substantial non-infringing use" was not thereby liable for contributory copyright infringement, even though the users of the technology engaged in infringement made possible by the technology. The decision recognizes that technology may be used for both infringing and non-infringing purposes, and that the mere capability of substantial non-infringing use tips the balance in favor of permitting the technology. Sony, 464 U.S. at 430-31. 23 inherently unjust to subject the public to statutes in which it had essentially no say, and then not even give it-us-the benefit of whatever exceptions from liability were put there by copyright industries.
Worse, this apparent unfairness is magnified, because the consumers whose infringement is being decided are generally not even before the court; whatever arguments they might have made to protect themselves will never be heard. Instead, their rights are adjudicated in absentia, in lawsuits for contributory infringement and vicarious liability-such as the Sony and Napster cases (and the more recent Aimster and Grokster cases). It might be tempting for an over- 95 96 worked federal judge to conclude that some kind of infringement must have occurred, so it doesn't really matter which. And that may be literally true with respect to the defendant before the court, whose third-party liability depends only on a finding of some consumer infringement. This kind of decision, however, does a disservice to consumers who, no less than copyright industries, deserve the benefit of whatever limitations on copyright may have been agreed among the parties to the negotiations over the statute.
The Constitutional purpose of copyright is to "promote the progress of Science and the Useful Arts." Under the Constitution, then, copyright must increase access to works of REV. 19 (1996) . 24 works against the rights of content owners to compensation. The public, however, is largely 100 unrepresented in the process of making copyright laws, and the public right to use works is not part of the discussion over the shape of copyright legislation, because copyright legislation is 101 the result of industry consensus enacted by Congress. Consequently, the right of the public to use copyrighted works depends largely on the courts' interpretation of the legislation created by content owners, and courts therefore must be especially sensitive and precise in deciding such cases.
In asserting consumer infringement, copyright owners (as in Napster, Aimster and Grokster) tend to claim undifferentiated ownership of their works. But it is elementary that 102 some uses of copyrighted works may infringe while others do not; this is the inherent nature of copyright, which defines specifically the uses that are exclusive to, and thus licensable by, the copyright owner, and leaves the remainder to the public.
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In addition, as we have already seen, different rights are often owned by different persons: Thus, the performance right in musical works is typically owned by the composer and the publisher of the work, while the reproduction right in sound recordings embodying the work is owned by the record company. Proper identification of the rights involved is essential to determine from whom a license is needed. The Napster case itself illustrates this point: After the record companies had succeeded in shutting down Napster's service, they themselves encountered copyright claims from music composers and publishers when they attempted to inaugurate (2000)) become meaningless as soon as digital technology is involved, since all digital performances and displays (including private ones) require that a "copy" be made. Moreover, should the owner of the performance right wish to license it, she will not succeed unless the holder of the reproduction right also licenses the work (because the work cannot be exploited by a digital performance unless the reproduction right is also licensed). See Reese, The Public Display Right, supra note 102, at 136. The RAM copy "doctrine" has a fascinating history, beginning in 1988 in a case concluding that although a RAM copy was a copyright "copy," the defendant was not liable for infringement under section 117. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5 Cir. 1988 ). The first case in which a defendant actually was liable for making th a RAM copy apparently was a district court case in Illinois, which did little more than cite the Nimmer treatise for the proposition that loading a file into a computer's "memory" constitutes "copying. " See ISC-Bunker Ramo Corp. v. Altech, Inc., 765 F.Supp. 1310 , 1332 (N.D. Ill. 1990 , citing 2 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, § 8. 08 (1989) . On this point, however, the Nimmer treatise in 1989 included little reasoning, relying on the CONTU Report, supra note 15, which said that "The introduction of a work into a computer memory would . . . be a reproduction of the work." CONTU Report at 40. The interesting thing about the language of the CONTU Report is that it was written in 1980, a time when the term "memory" was frequently used interchangeably to mean any form of computer storage, whether volatile (disappears when the computer is shut down, for example RAM) or not (remains after shutdown, for example a hard disk). There is reason to believe that the CONTU Report was referring to disk storage rather than to RAM storage, in light of its recommendation that section 117 be amended to permit the rightful possessor of computer software to copy or adapt it, if doing so is "an essential step" in using the software. See CONTU Report at 29-30. The reference to "adapt[ing]" software is probably best read as permitting the modification and recompiling of source code, something frequently necessary to run software in 1980, before the prevalence of mass-market, shrink-wrapped software. It is therefore questionable whether the Nimmer treatise, and thus the Altech case, are on a solid footing when they apply the language of the CONTU Report to RAM copies. In any case, the idea of RAM copies remained obscure until 1993, when it returned in the MAI case, supra. Like Altech, however, MAI did little more than conclude that copies in RAM were fixed and therefore their creation implicated the reproduction right. On the issue of fixation, the court said only that "by showing that Peak loads the software into the RAM and is then able to view the system error log and diagnose the problem with the computer, MAI has adequately shown that the representation created in the RAM is 'sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration.'" MAI at 518 (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000)). Since MAI, the doctrine has been uncritically accepted in a series of lower court cases, none of which engaged in any kind of critical examination of the rule or what it might mean. See Mark A. Lemley, Dealing with Overlapping Copyrights on the Internet, 22 U. DAYTON L. REV. 547, 550-52 n. 20 & n. 26 (1997) . Perhaps the crowning moment for the RAM copy doctrine came in September 1995, when the White Paper declared that "It has long been clear under U.S. law that the placement of copyrighted material into a computer's memory is a reproduction of that material . . . ." WHITE PAPER, supra note 66, at 64-65.
After they succeeded in shutting down Napster, content owners filed lawsuits against individual users 106 of P2P services. The vast majority of these cases have been settled, because content owners have been willing to accept sums far less than the cost to of defense to the defendant. The few cases that have not settled have not so far provided any analysis of the merits of the content owners' claims. E.g., Elektra Enter. Group, Inc. v (visited Mar. 22, 2005) (industry must "send a strong message that the individual users of these pirate networks can be caught and face the consequences"). Jessica Litman has noted that the rhetoric has become increasingly overheated as time goes on. Litman, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT, supra note 16, ch. 5. Professor Litman provides the example of "piracy": As recently as the 1980's, the term "piracy" referred to large-scale, infringement for profit. Today, by contrast, a college student using a P2P network to download a copyrighted sound recording in MP3 format is as likely to be called a "pirate" as is a facility in China churning out hundreds of thousands of infringing music CDs each day. See id. at 85.
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Finally, the principal response of content owners to the problem of easy distribution by the public has been litigation against third parties supplying access to distribution capability (e.g., Napster). The content industries' battle for control of distribution can be won only if the public 106 cooperates. The technology genie cannot be intimidated back into the lamp; as long as the public believes it has the right to distribute copyrighted content for free, someone will provide it with the means to do so. Perhaps the next step (suggested in 1995 by the Clinton Administration's "Information Infrastructure Task Force ) for content owners should be to attempt to educate the 107 public about its infringement of content owners' rights. If, however, content owners want to enlist the public to help control infringement, the industries must be willing to support propositions of copyright law that make sense to the public. Intelligibility begins with consistency.
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Content owners, however, have tried to substitute rhetoric of "theft" and "piracy" for intelligi-
109
Of course, precision may lead us to conclude that the copyright regime is illogical, if not incomprehen-110 sible. If so, however, our efforts toward precision will not have been in vain, because a revamping of copyright ought to proceed from the clearest possible understanding of the system currently in place.
See supra part III.A.
111
Napster, 239 F.3d at 1012. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 33, at § 2.16 (citing cases). 114 27 ble rules. This will surely fail. Public understanding of the rules depends on precision and consistency in determining which rights are infringed by which activities.
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For these reasons, then, we turn next to a consideration of the specific activities of users of P2P networks, and the copyright consequences of those activities.
B. P2P Activities and Copyright Consequences
Users of a P2P network may be downloaders (clients), distributors (servers), or both.
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Because the activities of downloaders differ from those of distributors, the legal consequences may differ as well; in the case of users who both download and distribute, both sets of consequences will attach.
Downloaders
When acting as a downloader, a user searches the network and, if the desired information is found, downloads the file directly from the user on whose system it resides. There are 112 potentially two infringing activities of downloaders: The network search, and the download that takes place if the desired information is found. The network search does not infringe any rights of copyright owners. The search produces only a list of the names of the files residing on the computers of users functioning as servers. Although the culture of P2P networks has produced a somewhat standardized format for these filenames, they are not created by the owners of the 113 content they contain, but rather are created by the users themselves. In most cases, of course, the filenames include at least the name of the musical work embodied in the file; there is widespread agreement, however, that names and titles of works are not copyrightable.
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In fact, if one accepts the RAM copy doctrine, many more "copies" are made along the way. See supra 115 note105. Not all of these copies infringe; the DMCA expressly immunizes some from copyright infringement liability. See 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). However, the DMCA, like all recent copyright legislation, was the result of negotiation among copyright industries, and unsurprisingly its exemptions do not extend to members of the public, who were unrepresented in the negotiations. Consequently, the RAM and other incidental copies made by the recipient of a P2P transmission are not exempt under the provisions of the DMCA. See id. However, they are all subject to the same analysis as the specifically indentifiable copy made on the user's hard disk. Downloading a file from a P2P network involves making at least one "copy," namely 115 the file saved on the downloader's hard disk. In the absence of valid defenses, this copy violates the copyright owner's right of reproduction under section 106(1). The question then becomes whether a consumer, downloading a file from a P2P network, has a valid defense to infringement resulting from making the resulting copy or copies. There are, in this context, two principal defenses that can be raised by consumers: The first is based on fair use; the second, on the 116 AHRA's provision that no infringement action can be brought based on a consumer's noncommercial copying to make digital musical recordings or analog musical recordings.
117
But see BMG Music v. Gonzalez, 2005 WL 106592 (N.D. Ill.) . In Gonzalez, the district court granted 118 summary judgment to the plaintiff record companies on their claim of infringement. The entire analysis occupies just one paragraph:
Gonzalez asserts that the "fair use" defense applies because she: (1) was just "sampling" the songs to determine if she wanted to purchase them; (2) "sampling" by direct infringers is a "fair use." Second, the contention that Gonzalez already owned some of the recordings she downloaded is not relevant because the Recording Companies only seek redress for songs that Gonzalez admits she did not own. Finally, the court in A & M Records, Inc. held that the cumulative effect of direct infringers, like Gonzalez, harms the recording industry by reducing sales and "raising barriers" to the recording industry's "entry into the market for digital downloading of music." Id. at 1016. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS summary judgment on the infringement claim.
Id. at *1. The court's impatience with the claim is clearly discernible, but hardly excuses its perfunctory analysis.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) . 119 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, 510 U.S. 569, 579, 584-85 (1994) ; Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. 
(a) Fair use
There is at least a plausible argument that P2P copying by downloaders is fair use.
118
Section 107 sets out four non-exclusive factors courts are to consider in determining whether a particular use is fair: (a) the purpose and character of the use; (b) the nature of the copied work; (c) the amount copied; and (d) the effect of the use on the market for the copied work.
119
In analyzing the first factor, purpose and character of the use, courts look principally to two aspects of the use: First, whether the copying is transformative, and second, whether the copying is commercial. "Transformative" copying transforms the copied work into something 120 new. In the case of peer-to-peer copying of recorded music, much of the value to the consumer 121 lies in the fact that the audible perception of the copy is very close, if not identical, to that of the original, authorized recording. This kind of copying does not transform the recording into anything new; the transformation into a new medium is irrelevant when the consumer's 122 perception of the content is essentially the same. At the same time, however, the copying that takes place by a downloader is not commercial. Home copying for personal use is the paradigm See Napster, 239 F.3d at 1015. The Napster district court also considered "commercial" the 123 distribution of files to "anonymous requesters." Napster, 114 F.Supp.2d at 912. This illustrates the kind of blurring that can easily take place when one fails to distinguish the activities of users carefully. We are here concerned with copying, not with distribution.
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
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Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 618 F.2d 972 (2d Cir. 1986 ).
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Napster, 239 F.3d at 1016.
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Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449-50 (1983) . 127 See Worldwide Church of God v. Philadelphia Church of God, 227 F.3d 1110 , 1118 (9th Cir.2000 .
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Sony, 464 U.S. at 449-50. 129 Id.
130 30 of noncommercial use. To be sure, persons downloading music save the expense of purchasing copies. However, the same could be said for much, if not all, home copying for personal use. A 123 personal use copy of a magazine article, made at the public library, saves the expense of ordering a back issue of the magazine, but does not thereby become "commercial." On the whole, this factor does not clearly weigh either for or against fair use. P2P copying is neither transformative (which weighs against fair use), nor is it commercial (which weighs in favor of fair use).
The second factor, nature of the copied work, looks at whether the copied work is creative or imaginative, as opposed to being factual or fact-based.. The former is "closer to the intended core of copyright protection," while the latter, in order not to foreclose subsequent authors 124 from creating their own works based on the same facts, receive less protection. On this 125 spectrum, there is little question that the musical works and sound recordings downloaded from a P2P network are creative. This, however, does not preclude a finding of fair use: In Sony, the 126 copied works were creative, yet the Court did not hesitate to find the use fair, especially in light of the fact that performances of the works were made available free of charge to home viewers.
127
Very similar circumstances apply to musical works copied via P2P technology, almost all of which are performed on the radio (from which they clearly could be legally copied) and by other legitimate means. Accordingly, under Sony, this factor weighs slightly in favor of fair use.
The third factor involves the amount copied from the copied work. The more of the work is copied, the less likely it is that the use is fair, although there are circumstances in which 128 copying an entire work is fair use. In Sony, the Court held that copying an entire work was 129 more likely to be fair use when performances of the entire work are made available to the public free of charge by the copyright owner. Performances of the works copied by P2P downloaders 130 are readily available, free of charge, in radio broadcasts and webcasts. The principal advantages of downloading via a P2P network are (a) that the resulting musical recording is digital, with high audio fidelity; (b) the resulting file is small, due to the compression of the musical information in the MP3 format; and (c) downloading is interactive, meaning that the downloader can choose when and what to receive. None of these differences, however, are relevant to whether copying of the entire work is or isn't fair use. Because copyright owners make performances of their works, in their entirety, available to the public free of charge, copying of the entire work (as opposed to just some of the work) by downloaders does not weigh against fair use.
The fourth factor, considered by the Supreme Court as a crucial factor in fair use, is the 131 effect of the use on the market for the copied work. The weight given to this factor depends, however, on the relative strength of the other factors. The evidence of market effect in Napster 132 was in conflict. The plaintiffs introduced expert evidence, and the district court held, that Napster use harmed the market for copyrighted musical compositions and sound recordings in two ways: First, it allegedly reduced CD sales among college students, and second, it "raises barriers to plaintiffs' entry into the market for the digital downloading of music." This second element of 133 "harm" is questionable: Every use, including fair use, can be said to raise a barrier to the plaintiff's ability to enter the market for that use. Fair use photocopying in a public library, for example, might raises a barrier to the plaintiff's entry into the market either for providing photocopies of its articles, or for selling back issues of its publications. Accepting this as a relevant factor presupposes that the copyright owner is presumptively entitled compensation for every use of its work, a conclusion belied by the highly specific nature of the rights conferred by copyright (with others left to the public).
The other item of harm, reduced CD sales, is more in line with traditional fair use analysis. The testimony on this point was in conflict, and the district court, as it was entitled to do, credited the plaintiffs' testimony rather than the defendant's. In 2004, however, CD sales 134 increased over the prior year, and the Apple iTunes digital music service sold in 150 millionth authorized download of music. It is possible that the record companies were too hasty in 135 predicting dire consequences from the advent of P2P services. If so, it would not be the first time that the entertainment industry was wrong about new technology: The movie studios' lawsuit against Sony for distributing the Betamax VCR was similarly founded on predictions that VCRs Jack Valenti, president of the Motion Picture Association of America, testified before Congress that (visited Mar. 24, 2005) ; N.Y. Times, Jack Valenti on Copying, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/09/biztech/articles/02napster.html (visited Mar. 24, 2005) .
In fact, videocassette sales-mostly to enterprises that rent them to consumers-now rival box-office 137 receipts. N.Y. Times, Jack Valenti on Copying, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech/00/09/biztech/articles/02napster.html (visited Feb. 5, 2002 Because the other factors are relatively strong in favor of fair use, and the district court's finding of harm to the plaintiff's market is based in part on "barriers to entry," a questionable foundation, the fourth factor weighs only slightly against fair use.
To summarize, the copies of musical works and sound recordings made by downloading P2P users should be protected under the fair use doctrine. The first factor is neutral; the second and third weigh in favor of fair use; the fourth weighs at most only slightly against fair use. Under Sony and subsequent cases, application of the fair use factors of section 107 results in the conclusion that these copies are not infringing. 
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The section thus makes explicit that consumers do not infringe by making noncommercial digital or analog musical recordings. As such it would seem to foreclose any claim that P2P downloaders are infringing copyright. But section 1008 goes farther than that: By prohibiting "any action based on" consumer activity, it seems directly to prohibit bringing actions for contributory infringement or claiming vicarious liability for infringement, if based on protected consumer conduct. In Napster, however, the Ninth Circuit held that the exemption from liability under section 1008 is not available to downloaders, and hence, not to Napster itself. The court 142 reasoned that section 1008 permits users to make "digital musical recordings," which are defined in section 1001 to exclude computer media (including disks). Thus, a computer disk containing 143 a musical recording is excluded from the definition of "digital musical recording" under the AHRA.
144
It is true enough that "digital musical recordings" as defined in the AHRA do not include musical recordings fixed on a computer disk. When the AHRA was adopted in 1992, computer manufacturers had successfully bargained for the exclusion of their products, because they did not want to be subject to the copy-protection requirement or the media royalty. Content owners 145 conceded the point. Nevertheless, it is clear that musical recordings fixed on a computer disk are musical recordings of some sort. The AHRA itself bifurcates the universe of musical recordings into "digital" and "analog." Only the former is defined; the latter presumably includes everything not within the definition of the former. If a computer disk containing a musical recording is not a "digital musical recording," then it must be an "analog musical recording." While it may seem strange to call a digital file "analog," it is no more surprising than the conclusion that a digital recording of music is not a "digital musical recording." Both of these odd results must be seen as artifacts of the process of copyright legislation, in which industries negotiate fantastically detailed provisions, rather than Congress providing broad guidance. In this case, Congress's (and the affected industries') intent in enacting the AHRA was clearly to exempt every form of home The purpose of including the definition seems to have been to specify that devices "marketed for the 148 primary purpose of . . . making a digital audio copied recording" are subject to the AHRA's obligation to account. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001(3) (2000) (definition of "digital audio recording device"); id. § 1003(a) (obligation to account).
See supra notes ___-___ and accompanying text. simply gives effect to the legislative scheme that Congress enacted, at the request of the affected industries, 10 years ago. If the industries are now unsatisfied with the compromise they reached in 1992, the burden is on them to submit a new compromise to Congress, not to press courts to remake the exemption provided by the AHRA.
There is another, basis, too, for the argument that noncommercial consumer recording of MP3 files on computers is immunized under section 1008. An MP3 file, while not a "digital musical recording," is a "digital audio copied recording." This term is defined in the Copyright Act to mean "a reproduction in a digital format of a digital musical recording, whether . . . made directly from another digital musical recording or indirectly from a transmission." The term 147 specifies a digital copy of a digital musical recording, which does not itself have to meet the definition of "digital musical recording" (otherwise there would be no need to define separately "digital audio copied recording"). As such, it is at least plausible that section 1008, which talks 148 in terms of consumers making "digital musical recordings," should be interpreted to mean consumers making "digital audio copied recordings," since the latter are defined as copies of the former, and consumer copying of digital originals is what section 1008 immunizes from liability. Under the AHRA, "digital audio recording devices," which are required to include the SCMS copy control technology, are devices primarily marketed to create digital audio copied 149 recordings. However, the Act does not preclude the possibility that other devices, such as 150 computers, could make digital audio copied recordings (unlike digital musical recordings, which are defined to exclude fixations in computer media).
In any case, the fundamental issue in resolving the liability of P2P downloaders is whether consumers do, or don't, have the right to make home copies of recorded music for personal use. The industry compromise of 1992, enacted as the AHRA, was that consumers have that right. Any other conclusion produces the unintelligible result that, while a consumer may freely borrow a CD from a neighbor and copy it onto a digital audio tape, downloading the same content from his neighbor via Grokster and then creating a digital audio tape of the content is copyright infringement. This is the kind of "logic" that makes the public give up on copyright, See supra Part I.B.3. 151 See, e.g., Reese, The Public Display Right, supra note 102, at 126-35 & nn. 195-98 (collecting 152 sources). Historically, to "distribute" for copyright purposes required distribution of tangible objects in which copyrighted works were fixed. In the mid-1990's, the so-called "Green Paper" recommended amending the Copyright Act to provide that a "distribution" could also take place by electronic means. Although the suggested amendment was never made, numerous cases since then have held that electronic distribution is "distribution" for copyright purposes. copyright owners, and copyright lawyers. It is singularly inappropriate at the present time, when content owners are trying to impress on the public the importance of abiding by copyright rules.
We may conclude, then, that the copying of music by downloaders does not infringe; although clearly the recipients are reproducing both sound recordings and musical works, the reproductions are permitted both under the fair use doctrine and under the AHRA.
Distributors
To say that downloaders of music don't infringe, however, is not conclusive on the question of P2P user liability. In addition to downloading, many P2P users also permit others to download from them, thereby engaging in what the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act ("DPRSRA") calls "digital phonorecord delivery." Digital phonorecord 151 delivery is legally and, in most respects functionally, the same as distributing tangible copies of a phonorecord to the public. This implicates the copyright owner's exclusive right of distribution under section 106(3).
The concept of electronic "distribution" has been criticized, chiefly on the ground that it does not involve the distribution of tangible objects. Historically, distribution (which, when it 152 is made to the public, is usually called "publication") has meant distribution of tangible copies (or phonorecords) by sale, rental, lease or lending. Clearly this is not what happens when a 153 work is transmitted over the internet to a user; first, no tangible object changes hands; and second, the originator of the transmission usually retains a copy of the transmitted content. But arguing that distribution must involve the transfer of tangible objects ignores the reality of content transmission which, at least when it results in an identifiable fixation on the recipient's computer, is for the recipient the functional equivalent of receiving a tangible copy. The argument needlessly anchors the concept of "distribution," by which copies are disseminated, to the past, when the only way copies could be disseminated was by dissemination of tangible See supra note 105, discussing the RAM copy doctrine. 154 See Reese, The Public Display Right, supra note 102. 155 See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("To 'display' a work means to show a copy of it . . . .") (emphasis added).
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Although copyright owners of musical works do have an exclusive display right, see id. § 106(5), it applies only to the display of copies (e.g., sheet music), and not to phonorecords, of the work. Id. § 101. 36 objects. Any process by which reproductions are in fact disseminated, whether by their direct dissemination or by the transmission of their content to a remote place where the content is fixed, is the functional equivalent of "distribution" and implicates the rights under § 106(3).
Another objection to considering digital phonorecord delivery to constitute a "distribution" for copyright purposes stems from the RAM copy doctrine, discussed above. That is, 154 courts may consider a temporary copy of a work made in the volatile random access memory of a computer and necessary in order to view, play or otherwise access the work, to be "fixed" and therefore a "copy" for copyright purposes. The objection may arise that if merely viewing a work involves its "reproduction," then it is only a short step to find that the same viewing also requires a "distribution." If so, then merely looking at a work in digital format might result in two separate acts of infringement: Reproduction by the viewer, and distribution by the web site proprietor.
For visually perceptible works, at least, other legal analyses have been proposed to solve this problem: For example, rather than consider the RAM copy of an image to be a "reproduction," and the transmission of the image to the viewer a "distribution," the entire process could be collapsed into a "public display" of the work. Whatever the merits of this approach for works 155 that can be visually perceived, however, the public display right is not useful to the owners of sound recordings (who have no right of public display in their works) or of music (copies of which are not "displayed" when a sound recording is transmitted). For recorded music, it is 156 best to stay within the framework the industries themselves negotiated in 1995, and to recognize formally that digital phonorecord delivery constitutes the distribution of the phonorecord delivered.
We may conclude, then, that digital phonorecord delivery taking place by P2P internet transmission of MP3 files constitutes "distribution"by the transmitter of the sound recordings and the musical works embodied in the files. As such, it violates the exclusive right of distribution in both the sound recording and the musical work embodied in the sound recording. As with reproduction, then, we can now proceed to examine whether the distributor has any defenses. This, however, is a much easier exercise than was the case with the distribution right: There are few defenses to a claim of infringing public distribution, and none that apply to P2P transmitters of recorded music.
First, neither of the defenses that protect the recipients of the transmission-fair use and the AHRA-apply to the distribution of MP3 files. In general the fair use defense is a defense to Cf. Napster, 114 F. Supp.2d at 912 ("a host user sending a file cannot be said to engage in a 157 personal use when distributing that file to an anonymous requester").
See Litman, Digital Copyright, supra note 16, at 61 (suggesting that content owners would "take back," 158 if they could, the right of consumers to make personal use copies).
In re Aimster Copyright Litigation, 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003).
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Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 380 F.3d 1154 (9th Cir.) , cert. granted, ___ 160 U.S. ___ , 125 S. Ct. 686 (2004) . 37 a claim of infringing reproduction, not distribution. While it may not be inconceivable that the fair use defense could protect public distribution, it is extremely unlikely. In the case of public 157 distribution of MP3 files, if the record companies' testimony is believed, the distribution to tens of millions of users severely harms the market for recorded music, a factor highly relevant to fair use analysis. The analysis for the distributor differs from that for the downloader, who makes a single copy, for personal use. The distributor, by contrast, opens his disk for the entire world to copy, if they wish. The former is fair use; the latter is not.
Similarly, the AHRA, which provides a safe harbor for digital or analog, non-commercial personal use copies, provides no defense at all for distribution. It is limited by its terms to reproduction.
Overall, then, I conclude that users of P2P networks infringe by distributing recorded music without permission, but they do not infringe by making personal use copies. This accords with the reality of the content business: In recent memory, control of distribution has been more important to content owners than control of reproduction. The technologies of reproduction-the photocopier, videocassette recorder, audio tape recorder (analog and digital), CD burner-are all facts of life, and despite content owners' occasional attempts to litigate them out of existence, are likely to stay that way. What is so profoundly threatening about P2P technology is not that it facilitates copying; that is nothing new. Rather, it is P2P's distribution capability, which directly undermines content owners' control of their product, that is its most dangerous aspect. So it may be of some comfort to content owners that while they may have made some bargains during the 1990's that they wish they hadn't, at least they haven't traded away the right to control public 158 distribution of their works.
IV. Poor Proxies for the Public Interest
Unfortunately for content owners, having a legal right is not the same thing as enforcing that right. In many applications of P2P technology, enforcement turns out to be very difficult. After Napster, content owners won a case against the provider of another P2P technology that used a central index. They fared less well in a case brought against the providers of decentral-159 ized and "supernode" P2P technology, where there is no central entity responsible for content and data flow. That case is currently before the Supreme Court; oral arguments were heard on 160
